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Getting New Drugs to People with AIDS:
A Public Policy Response to Lansdale
By MARSHA N. COHEN*

Introduction
In an essay published recently in this journal,' Bret Lansdale2 argued that the new drug approval system administered by the Federal
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) deprives people with AIDS
(PWA) of due process of law. Mr. Lansdale also proposed modifications
in that system to speed the delivery of drugs to patients who need them.
Although I fully endorse the concept underlying Lansdale's proposalsnamely, that patient need for therapy should be considered in the design
of drug approval mechanisms generally and in the design of individual
drug study protocols-I agree on the basis of sound public policy, rather
than on constitutional grounds.
AIDS has already taken a tragic number of lives,3 and many more
are fated to be lost absent a dramatic therapeutic breakthrough. In order
for the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process to apply to a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, however, there must be a demonstration that the government is responsible for the loss, not just that the loss
will occur. Lansdale argues that the government deprives PWA of their
interests in life and liberty through its drug approval requirements,
which frequently necessitate the use of double-blind placebo-controlled
studies4 to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed new therapy. In this
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1971; B.A., Smith College, 1968. The author wishes to thank Tracy
Hendrickson of the Hastings Class of 1991 for her research assistance.
1. Essay, A ProceduralDue Process Attack on FDA Regulations: Getting New Drugs to
People with AIDS, 18 HAsriNGs CONST. L.Q. 417 (1991).
2. The essay was written by Bret L. Lansdale, a member of the Hastings College of the
Law, Class of 1991, who succumbed to AIDS on October 21, 1990. A memorial to Mr. Lansdale was published with his essay at 18 HAmNGs CONST. L.Q. 257 (1991).
3. As of December 31, 1990, 100,813 Americans had died of AIDS. Essay, supranote 1,
*

at 440 n.175.
4. In a double-blind placebo-controlled study, experimental subjects are randomly divided into groups to receive either the drug being tested or a placebo, with neither subject nor
investigator aware of who is in which group. It is well accepted that a certain percentage of
people will appear to respond favorably to any treatment regimen that they (or their physician)
feel will be helpful, whether it is effective or not; this is the so-called "placebo effect." Janssen,
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way, "the FDA delays dissemination of helpful drugs and therapies to
sick people." 5

I. The "Helpful" Drug Fallacy
The deprivation of life and liberty of PWA is predicated on the assumption that the therapies delayed by the FDA are in fact "helpful."
The drug development process is complicated and time-consuming; until

significant testing has been completed, it cannot be assumed that even the
most promising of drug therapies will ultimately be found sufficiently
safe and effective to release for marketing.6
Drug testing proceeds in a well-established pattern. After a drug
sponsor, generally a pharmaceutical manufacturer, has completed laboratory development and animal testing, it seeks FDA approval for
human testing by filing a "Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption
The Courts, Terminal Patients, and UnapprovedDrugs, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 1979, at 5-6.
The double-blind design, with a placebo control, enables researchers to distinguish the actual
effects of a drug being tested from any placebo effects. See Flieger, Testing in 'RealPeople" in
FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (An

FDA CONSUMER Special Report), Jan. 1988, at 14.

5. Essay, supra note 1, at 425. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act requires that
every new drug introduced into interstate commerce first be proven both safe and effective. 21
U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West Supp. 1991). The new drug application, or NDA, must include substantial evidence that the drug "will have the effect it purports or is represented to have ......
Id. "Substantial evidence" is defined by statute to mean
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports
or is represented to have ....
Id. Neither the statute nor the implementing regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 310-314 (1990), requires double-blind placebo-controlled studies. Such studies are, however, the method frequently chosen by investigators of new drug efficacy because they are most likely to provide a
clear and convincing demonstration of the test drug's efficacy, and to do so efficiently. FDA
personnel state:
It is generally agreed, for example, that the clinical trials of the anti-AIDS drug
zidovudine (formerly known as azidothymidine, or AZT) were actually shortened by
testing it against a placebo. The studies showed dramatically better results for
zidovudine, compared to a placebo, and FDA was able to approve the drug for marketing in March 1987, only four months after receiving an application from the
drug's manufacturer ....
Flieger, supra note 4, at 14.
6. One pharmaceutical company, Upjohn, estimates that only 20 of every 2,000 chemicals studied will ever be tested in humans, and that only one of that 20 will prove safe and
effective enough for marketing. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PMA), a
trade association of research pharmaceutical firms, uses an estimate of one marketed product
for every 10,000 chemicals studied. Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratoryand Animal Studies, in
FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (An

FDA CONSUMER Special Report), Jan. 1988, at 11.

Spring 19911

GETTING NEW AIDS DRUGS

for a New Drug" (IND).? After FDA approval, the first human testing,
referred to as phase I, begins. Phase I testing, most often done on
healthy volunteers, rather than patients, is designed to test a drug's basic
safety, to determine its side effects, and, if patient volunteers are used, to
gain very early evidence of effectiveness. Phase I studies usually include
only 20 to 100 people and take from six months to more than a year to
complete.
The limited scope of phase I testing allows only the most tentative
conclusions about a drug's safety. A serious adverse event caused by the
test drug (such as major organ failure or death) might occur only at a
low frequency and thus may not be evident when only a small number of
people have taken the drug.8
Phase II, which follows successful completion of phase I, involves
several hundred patient subjects in studies to determine whether the drug
is effective. Although double-blind placebo-controlled studies are not demanded by statute or regulation, 9 they are commonly utilized in phase II
and phase III testing to produce data which can support conclusions
concerning drug efficacy. Because of the "placebo effect," 1 ° phase II efficacy studies must be carefully designed to distinguish the impact of the
drug from any improvements in a patient due to non-drug causes. Confounding conditions and events (such as patient ailments other than the
drug's target and simultaneous therapy for other health problems) must
be kept to a minimum so that researchers can determine whether any
improvement seen in test subjects is attributable to the drug itself.1"
Although additional safety evidence is obtained at this stage, a lack of
serious adverse effects during phase II still cannot assure safety in wide7. The basic description of drug testing and review which follows may be found in
Flieger, supra note 4, at 13-17.
8. See Ackerman, Watchingfor Problems That TestingMay Have Missed, in FROM TEST
TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (An FDA CONSUMER Special Report), Jan. 1988, at 51.
9. Supra note 5.

10. See supra note 4.
11. The need to enroll patient volunteers who fit particular demographic and health status
criteria has been a subject of considerable irritation in studies of AIDS drugs, see Essay, supra
note 1, at 425, because drug tests have been perceived by PWA as one hope for survival.
Because of the nature of AIDS-an immune deficiency which itself does not kill, but allows

other infections the opportunity to thrive and thus to kill-the potential volunteer population
is subject to a variety of ailments, some of which may be considered disqualifying for participation by drug researchers. In addition, drug research has tended to use fairly narrow demo-

graphic parameters (ag., white males). To the extent that narrow definitions make it difficult
to recruit patient volunteers, studies are delayed; common sense suggests that when this happens the parameters should be broadened. In recognition of the need to test drugs on volun-

teers representative of the potential patient user population, FDA has issued clinical
pharmacology guidelines which require studies in "pertinent populations." Interview with Dr.
Roger Williams, Director of the Office of Generic Drugs, Federal Food and Drug Administration (Mar. 17, 1991).
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spread distribution.12
If phase II is successfully concluded 3-a process which takes from
several months to two years-phase III begins. Phase III consists of expanded trials, both controlled and uncontrolled, to gather additional
safety and efficacy information, as well as to collect data about such matters as optimum dosage amounts and schedules, from several hundred to
several thousand patients. This phase generally takes from one to three
years. Even phase III may not uncover adverse affects that occur at very
low frequency. Approval of the sponsor's New Drug Application
(NDA) after this level of testing, however, presents a level of risk that
scientists and policymakers feel is appropriate if a drug's efficacy has
been demonstrated. Naturally, more risk is tolerated in approving a drug
marketed for a serious or deadly condition than one marketed either for
an annoying but not life-threatening symptom or one which substitutes
for safer available therapy.' 4
Thus, a drug that has completed only phase I testing, or even phases
I and II, or that has completed phase III testing but has not yet been

subject to independent scrutiny, 5 may well not be "helpful." Although

it is tragically true that people with AIDS may be dead "long before the
FDA allows a new drug to be dispensed at all,"' 6 drugs that are not

efficacious will not have saved anyone. As therapies such as AZT 17 become available to slow the progress of AIDS, 8 at least in some patients,

12. Flieger, supra note 4, at 14.
13. Approximately 70% of experimental drugs tested in humans proceed from phase I to
phase II; about 33% reach phase III. Approximately 25 to 30% of drugs tested in humans
will successfully conclude phase III, and about 20% win receive approval to be marketed.
Flieger, supra note 4, at 14.
14. Lowry, .4Scientist's Viewpoint, in How SAFE IS SAFE? THE DESIGN OF POLICY ON
DRUGS AND FOOD ADDTVES 110-11 (1974). Lowry relates that some observers felt that the

Salk polio vaccine had been prematurely introduced; if there had been further testing an incident involving 260 injuries from improperly manufactured vaccine might have been avoided.
But the two or three year delay "would have resulted in 100,000 cases, or more, of paralytic
poliomyelitis. It was known ahead of time that this was true, and the risk was taken deliberately." The ratio of polio cases prevented to polio cases attributable to early release of the
vaccine was 400 to 1. "The benefit was rightly judged to far exceed the risk." Id. See also
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979).
15. Drug testing is organized and carried out by the drug sponsor, which is most often the
pharmaceutical company that intends to market the drug, and which thus has a major financial interest in obtaining marketing approval. The FDA's scrutiny is the only independent
review of the study data. Flieger, supra note 4, at 13.
16. Essay, supra note 1, at 428.
17. AZT is an inaccurate acronym for the anti-AIDS drug zidovudine, which was formerly known as azidothymidine. See supra note 5. As it is the name by which the drug is
popularly known, it will be used throughout this article.
18. Longevity for persons diagnosed with AIDS today has clearly increased over the longevity experienced in the early 1980s. The increase in longevity, however, reflects not just the
availability of AZT and other anti-viral drug treatments. Because there are better diagnostic
tools, PWA are obtaining the AIDS diagnosis earlier in the course of their illness. It is difficult
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and with AIDS research producing large numbers of potential drug therapies, 19 most of which will prove to be ineffective, 2" the protection of
consumers from ineffective drugs becomes ever more critical.2 1 Patients
subjected to ineffective drugs may suffer side effects or adverse reactions
that hasten their physical deterioration (perhaps even killing them), or
make them poor candidates for later effective therapy.2 2

II. The Inapplicability of Due Process
Even if we accept the premise that the FDA is preventing helpful
therapies from reaching sick people, existing case law does not support
the conclusion that the FDA's failure to approve or to make available
particular drugs more quickly is a violation of constitutional due process.
The cases of government inaction giving rise to constitutional violation
that are cited to support Lansdale's thesis are distinguishable because the
persons deprived-a prisoner in Estelle v. Gamble,2 3 an involuntarily
committed mentally retarded person in Youngberg v. Romeo24 -were
themselves unable to supply the needs withheld by the government because of their institutionalization by the government. As Professor Tribe
notes, "it plainly requires a further step to conclude that governmental
indifference ' 2 to suffering, in contexts not involving the confinement by
the government of the sufferer, violates a constitutional requirement.
The Supreme Court has not yet taken that step. Although we believe, as
does Tribe, that "government has affirmative duties to its citizens arising
out of the basic necessities of bodily survival,"' 26 we must recognize, as he
to separate these two factors in order to make precise comparisons between the life expectancy
of a PWA diagnosed in the early 1980s and one diagnosed today. The average life span for a
person diagnosed with AIDS today is approximately 14.2 months. Telephone interview with
the AIDS Office, San Francisco Department of Public Health (March 15, 1991).
19. As of February 1991 the FDA had received more than 330 INDs for prevention,
diagnosis or treatment of AIDS. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Newsletter, Feb.
18, 1991, at 6.
20. If AIDS therapies follow the pattern of other experimental drugs, it is expected that
no more than 20% will be marketed. Supra note 13. In light of the huge number of submissions for AIDS therapies it seems likely that a considerably smaller percentage will be found to
be either effective or drugs of choice.
21. "There are very few conditions, not even AIDS, that can't be made worse. For example, in the clinical trials of the once-promising AIDS drugs HPA-23 and suramin, the chemicals turned out to be so toxic that the studies had to be ended." Young, ExperimentalDrugs
for the Desperately Ill, in FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (An FDA CONSUMER Special Report), Jan. 1988, at 24-25.

22. See Barry, A Perspective on CompassionateParallelCategory C Treatment Track IND
Procedures,45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 347, 351 (1990).

23. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
24. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
25. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1335 (2d ed. 1988).

26. Id. at 1337. Professor Tribe would plainly favor the recognition of such a right, in line
with "the governing premise of this chapter-that active governmental imposition or con-
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does, that such duties are not legally enforceable at the present time.
scious governmental neglect differs qualitatively from the passive coercion that shapes life generally." Id. at 1335 n.39. That he would be especially sympathetic to Lansdale's argument is
obvious from his further statement that "relief against unjust indifference need not always take
the form of active assistance by government; at times such relief may require only that government relax its otherwise reasonable regulations to accommodate acute instances of need." Id.
There is no judicial support, however, for Professor Tribe's position. He admits that the
government's duty to meet human needs, other than through procedural safeguards, id. at
1336, is enforceable "in the streets and at the polling booth," id. at 1337, not primarily in the
courts.
The absence of judicial support for this position was also noted by Judge Legge of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California when, on December 3, 1990, he turned
down an AIDS patient's request for an order reversing the FDA's ban of the sale of a new drug
which had not received premarket approval. Woodroof v. Mlecko, No. C 90 3377 CAL (N.D.
Cal.), minute order filed Dec. 19, 1990. Cf. DeVito v. HEM, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D.
Pa. 1988). The plaintiff and others had been purchasing Peptide T, an amino acid compound
used to treat AIDS-related dementia, from its manufacturer when the FDA classified it as a
"new drug" and required that it be subjected to premarket approval. Judge Legge concluded
that "AIDS patients do not have a statutory or constitutional right to take new drugs that are
not approved by the FDA." He called the situation "heart-rending," and stated his belief that
"once a person is diagnosed as terminally ill... he ought to have the right to obtain most any
drug he believes would help alleviate the situation." But, he added, "that is not the law."
Doyle, AIDS PatientLoses Challenge to DrugBan, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 4, 1990, at A4,
col. 1.
The case was later voluntarily dismissed at the request of the plaintiff. The plaintiff expected to obtain continued access to Peptide T under 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (emergency use of an
investigational new drug); according to plaintiff's attorney he was unable to obtain such access
until March 1991. Telephone interview with Michael Cascino, Esq. (March 21, 1991). (The
probable reason for the delayed access is that the first major clinical study of Peptide T began
in March 1991. Hilton, Surprises in the War Against HIV, San Francisco Exam., Mar. 31,
1991, at B-4,col. 1.) In DeVito, supra, defendants, concluding it was not efficacious in treating
AIDS, had terminated clinical studies of Ampligen. Plaintiff's suit to continue using the drug
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Citing United States v. Rutherford, 442
U.S. 554 (1979), the court found no exemption from drug approval provisions for terminally ill
patients. DeVito, 705 F. Supp. at 1079-80. See infra text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
27. Lansdale cited, with hope, Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989). Even if Justice Brennan had
prevailed in DeShaney, and even if he were still sitting on the Court, the factual distinctions
between the case of Joshua DeShaney and that of people with AIDS seeking access to unreleased experimental drugs would not assure a constitutional decision in favor of the latter.
Justice Brennan's analysis of Joshua DeShaney's plight parallels quite closely the common law
doctrine that a person under no obligation who voluntarily undertakes to rescue has a duty to
continue the rescue when his or her actions or agreement to assist cut the victim off from other
sources of aid. Id. at 205-07. People with AIDS are not cut off from other sources of aid by
the FDA, and not left in a worse predicament than they otherwise were; admittedly the lack of
any hope other than an effective drug therapy makes this legal distinction ring quite hollow. It
is, however, relevant that the assistance that could have been provided to Joshua DeShaneyremoving him from his father's home where he was being abused-would have prevented the
harm that befell him. In stark contrast, quicker access to experimental drugs by PWA could
result in more net harm than benefit.
Justice Brennan further complained that the Court failed to "see that inaction can be
every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can result when a State undertakes a
vital duty and then ignores it." Id at 212. In proceeding with the review of drugs that could
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Another significant barrier to successful challenge of the FDA's regulatory authority in the area of approval of experimental therapies is
United States v. Rutherford.2" That 1979 case challenged the FDA's authority to prevent terminally ill cancer patients from obtaining Laetrile, a
drug not approved by the agency but claimed by its supporters to be safe
and effective in cancer treatment. In a unanimous decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that there is no implicit exemption for the
terminally ill from the premarket approval requirements of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.29 There was no constitutional challenge before
the Court. Commenting on the policy rationale for the statute, the Court
noted that to deny the relevance of the proof of safety and efficacy criteria for terminal patients "is to deny the Commission's authority over all
drugs, however toxic or ineffectual, for such individuals. If history is any
guide, this new market would not be long overlooked."' 30 As to the terminal patient's need for protection, the Court stated, "For the terminally
ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death
' 31
or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.
1II.

The Need for Change

Although the FDA's drug approval procedures are not subject to
successful challenge on constitutional or statutory grounds, this does not
diminish the validity and power of the arguments for change raised by
Lansdale and widely advocated among the AIDS patient and support
community. In order to evaluate fairly the need for change and to determine how it might be accomplished, it is necessary to understand the
nature of the FDA, the regulatory agency charged with the critical task
be used to treat PWA, the FDA is engaging in just the type of vital duty which Justice Brennan
contemplates. Its failure to act as quickly as we might like-or even its negligent conduct of
drug review-does not, as Justice Brennan himself recognizes in DeShaney, rise to the level of
a due process violation. Id. at 211.
28. 442 U.S. 544 (1979); see also Janssen, supra note 4.
29. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 551.
30. Id. at 557.
31. Id. at 555-56. The Court added, "it is often impossible to identify a patient as terminally ill except in retrospect." Id. at 556. Although the Rutherford Court expressed the concern that cancer patients would be harmed by relying on Laetrile, an unproven remedy, in lieu
of conventional treatments, which would be efficacious to some, if not all, cancer sufferers, id
at 556, that concern was only a minor factor in the Court's determination that drug approval
laws are applicable to drugs for the terminally ill. The Court's holding was based instead on
statutory interpretation. See id at 551. Thus the precedential value of the Rutherford holding
cannot be ignored because there are conventional treatments that may cure cancer, whereas
there are no curative treatments for AIDS. Further, it is likely that a significant percentage of
cancer patients who sought to use Laetrile had already exhausted available conventional therapies without arresting the progress of their cancer. In that respect a significant number of
cancer patients are in the same predicament as PWA: without any remedy except hope for the
as-yet-unproven.
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of overseeing the nation's drug supply.32
The first statute regulating pharmaceutical drugs was the Food and
Drug Act of 1906, passed at the behest of Dr. Harvey Wiley, Chief
Chemist of the Department of Agriculture, who was concerned about the
risks of untested chemicals in food and drugs. He dramatized this risk by
assembling a "poison squad" of department volunteers to test chemicals
on themselves. The statute did not, however, provide for premarket approval of drugs.3 3 Premarket proof of safety was first required by the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which is still in force today.
Congress passed that law in response to the deaths of more than 100
people from the drug Elixir Sulfanilamide, which had been created by
adding the solvent diethylene glycol (a deadly poison used as antifreeze)
to the miracle drug sulfa to make it available in liquid form. Apparently
no one bothered to test the solvent's safety.34
The Drug Amendments of 1962 added the requirement that drugs
also be proven efficacious before marketing. These amendments were
passed in the emotional aftermath of another drug tragedy, the
thalidomide disaster.3 5 Thalidomide, a mild sedative, caused phocomelia, the foreshortening of the limbs, in thousands of babies exposed to it
in utero in European countries where it had been approved for sale.3 6
Americans were spared this disaster as a result of the premarketing proof
of safety requirement.
Approval of Thalidomide's NDA had been prevented here by Dr.
Frances 0. Kelsey, an FDA medical officer. 37 The episode is important
in understanding the nature of the FDA and its response to AIDS. Dr.
Kelsey was hailed for saving Americans from the harm caused by
32. Particularly in the earlier years of the AIDS epidemic there was a tendency by people
and institutions affected by AIDS to portray those with a different perspective on the problem
as villains. The FDA has been subject to such portrayal and to protest on the grounds of a
laggardly pace of regulatory response to the crisis. See, e.g., Police Arrest AIDS Protesters
Blocking Access to FDA Offices, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1988, at 2, col. 3. A critical look at the
response of various individuals and institutions to AIDS demonstrates that many could have
done much better. Some were ignorant, some frightened, some disbelieving. And some were
villains. For a general view of the early years of AIDS, which provides a more than adequate
supply of villains, see R. SHILTs, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE

AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987).
33. Janssen, Outline of the History of US. DrugRegulation andLabeling, 36 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 420, 426-27 (1981).
34. Letter from Frank E. Young, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, and John A. Norris,
Deputy Commissioner of Food and Drugs (Jan. 1988), reprinted in FROM TEST TUBE TO
PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (An FDA CONSUMER Spe-

cial Report), Jan. 1988, at 2.
35. Id.
36. Janssen, supra note 33, at 437.
37. Thompson, Protecting 'Human Guinea Pigs" in FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT:
NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (An FDA CONSUMER Special Report),
Jan. 1988, at 20 (not citing Dr. Kelsey by name).
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thalidomide.3 5 To those who work39 with her as decisionmakers about
new drug approval at the FDA, she is a powerful reminder that the FDA
drug review staff is a critical barrier between American consumers and
drug-related disasters. The staff member who prevents a disaster will be
remembered. In contrast, to approve use of a drug courts disaster, and
there seems to be no mechanism to laud those who shepherd a drug to
early approval. 4' It may well be that the FDA employees' self-perception-whether conscious or not-as a barrier against drug-related disasters is an important factor in the FDA's overall conservative nature.
To a large extent it is appropriate for the FDA to be conservative or
even to be "obsessed with risk,"4 1 as was recently claimed. Only the
FDA's review of data generated by manufacturers protects consumers
from inappropriate approval of drugs. The approval of a drug has vast
economic consequences," and although improprieties have been remarkably few they have not been absent.43 In addition, over time FDA drug
38. Dr. Kelsey received the Distinguished Federal Civilian Service Award from President
John F. Kennedy on August 7, 1962. Telephone interview with Wallace Janssen, FDA Historian (March 13, 1991).
39. Dr. Kelsey continues to work at the FDA as Director of Scientific Investigations,
Office of Compliance, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
40. The FDA now institutionally encourages expedition in drug review, and the role of
scientist reviewers in the approval process is recognized as crucial. Norris, Fulfilling FDA's
Vision of FasterDrugReview, in FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES (An FDA CONSUMER Special Report), Jan. 1988, at 7. But no reviewer's name is connected with AZT's approval, for example, as Dr. Kelsey's name is linked
with keeping Thalidomide off the market. No specific action has been taken, if in fact any is
possible, to modify reviewers' incentive to be cautious. Telephone interview with Dr. Roger
Williams, supra note 11.
41. Henninger, Will the FDA Revert to Type?, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1990, at A16, col. 4.
This editorial writer blames the "obsession" on Congress, Ralph Nader, and the media:
over the past 75 years occasional, highly publicized accidents involving drugs have
given congressmen a pretext to announce, with the cameras rolling, that the agency is
too sloppy with risk.... Naderlike groups would identify risks from particular drugs,
and supportive newspaper reporters in Washington would vilify the FDA and offending drug companies for "negligence."
42. For example, if the experimental drug tacrine (Cognex) is approved for improvement
of memory in Alzheimer's disease patients, annual sales by sponsor Warner-Lambert are estimated to be $1 billion or more. The firm's current annual prescription drug sales are only
about $1.6 billion. FDA PanelRejects Alzheimer's Drug, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 16, 1991,
at A7, col. 3.
43. Maker of Generic DrugsAccused of DupingFDA; US. Says Bolar Swapped Products,
Hid Data,Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1990, at A13; GenericDrugs RecalledAfter Questions on Data,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1990, at D2, col. 5; WallStreet Illustrated,FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at
149 (Richardson-Merrell indicted for supplying falsified data to FDA about MER-29); Shenon, Lilly Pleads Guilty to Oraflex Charges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at A16, col. 1; see
Examination of the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 1973-74, Joint Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on
Health of the Comm. on Labor andPublic Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practiceand
Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. Part 7, at 2827
(1974) (statement of John Nestor, M.D.).
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approval personnel have perceived undue pressure from drug companies
(as well as from their own superiors) to approve drugs, even when unresolved concerns remained in their minds.'

In the 1970s an influential group of commentators raised a cry about
a "drug lag." They argued that Americans were being denied, or allowed
only delayed access to, valuable drug therapies that were available overseas." Consumerists did not share this view; they were concerned about
drugs being marketed before safety issues were adequately resolved, and
found FDA conservatism laudable, if not insufficiently protective.4 6 Furthermore, most new drugs (almost two-thirds of those approved by the

FDA in 1990, for example) 47 do not represent any significant therapeutic

gain. For those drugs, a cautionary "lag" may well be to the great advantage of the American public. 48 Since the 1970s a number of "blueribbon commissions" have studied the drug approval process. 9 Typically they have found the new drug approval system "fundamentally
sound," but its implementation in need of considerable improvement.5 0
In response, FDA commissioners have vowed to take action.5 1 In recent
years the FDA has decreased its approval time significantly.5 2 Nevertheless, drug development and approval remains a time-consuming process;
the FDA expects the development time even for a lifesaving drug to be
44. See supra note 43; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION 31-32 (May 1977)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].

45. Stone, Staff Paper: Economic Effect of New DrugRegulation in the UnitedStates, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT OF REVIEW
PANEL ON NEw DRUG REGULATION 19-23 (May 31, 1977).
46. "As protectors of the public ... [FDA medical officers] have to be extremely cautious
....
" Testimony of Sidney Wolfe, M.D., and Anita Johnson, Esq., Public Citizen Health

Research Group, before the Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEw DRUG REGULATION 2-3,

2-7 (May 7, 1975).
47. FasterFDA Action on 23 New MolecularEntitiesApproved Last Year, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association Newsletter, Jan. 7, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter FasterFDA Action].
48. The official FDA position in 1974 was that a drug lag existed in that drugs were
marketed overseas that were not available in the United States but, "when reviewed in perspective, the drug lag did not involve any drugs that represented important therapeutic gains and
was an expected consequence of the high regulatory standards imposed under United States
law." Hutt, Investigations and reports respecting FDA regulation of new drugs (PartII), 33
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 674, 675 (1983).

49. Iad
50. Id. at 677. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 44.
51. See, eg., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT BY
THE COMMISSIONER OF FOOD AND DRUGS ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REVIEW PANEL ON NEw DRUG REGULATION (March 1978).
52. In 1990 FDA reviews of NDAS for new molecular entities (the most important class
of proposed new drugs) took an average of 28.1 months as compared to 32.5 months for 1989

approvals. FasterFDA Action, supra note 47.
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approximately five to seven years. 3
The AIDS crisis has appropriately brought a patient-advocate voice
into the main regulatory arena for the first time."' The earlier outcry by
some cancer patients seeking to use Laetrile is distinguishable." Laetrile
proponents were seeking access to a product which no reputable pharmaceutical manufacturer was proposing, even as an experimental therapy.
Cancer patients in the "mainstream" of the health care system have since
1976 had access to the investigational drugs that the National Cancer

Institute considers most promising.5 Through a mechanism called the

"compassionate IND," the FDA has long allowed experimental drugs to
be distributed to patients with no available alternative therapies who
were otherwise ineligible for the drug studies.
AIDS patient-advocates have severely attacked the methods used to
test drugs for approval, the slow pace of the drug approval system, and
the unavailability of promising experimental therapies to a broad group
of patients.
PWA are, in Lansdale's words, "wager[ing] their lives" 58 by partici53. AZT's development time of two years is considered quite extraordinary, and probably
a record. Studies done by the FDA suggest that the average total development time (which
includes preclinical research, and laboratory and animal studies done prior to human testing)
for drugs worldwide is eight or nine years. In the United States, the comparable figure is
considered to be seven or eight years in general, and five or six years for a product of biotechnology. The PMA's general estimate of 12 years is discounted by the FDA because it includes
drugs developed by firms overseas, which encounter significant delays in finding American
development partners for their products. Telephone interview with Paul Coppinger, Deputy
Director, Office for Policy and Evaluation, FDA (Mar. 25, 1991).
54. The drug companies, which stand to profit significantly from faster approvals of their
products, have kept a rather low profile during the debates about FDA procedures fueled by
AIDS activism. There are undoubtedly multiple reasons for their stance. First, drug companies have liability concerns about premature marketing of products. Second, it would be unseemly for drug companies to urge (profitable) earlier approval, especially since they have
been attacked by the AIDS activists for the pricing of AIDS therapies that have been approved. See Chase, AIDS Activists Press Boycotts of Drug Firms,Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1991, at
BI, col. 3.
55. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979); see also Gup, Doctor's Unusual
Treatment Supported by Cancer Patients; PatientsSupport Doctor Barred by Area Hospital,
Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1979, at Bi; Jolna, ParentsDefy Mass. Court Order, Take Child to Mexico for Laetrile, Wash. Post, Jan 27, 1989, at A3.
56. These are known as "Group C Drugs." See Anticancer Drug Development; Memorandum of Understanding with the National Institutes of Health, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,510 (1979).
57. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (1990).
Some "compassionate INDs" have been granted for patients excluded from protocols for
demographic reasons. Children, for example, are generally not included in studies (unless the
drug is primarily for pediatric use), in large part because of the ethical complication of children's inability to consent themselves to the experimental risk. The compassionate IND mechanism has also been used to make experimental drugs available to test volunteers (and others)
between the end of studies deemed successful and the approval of the drug's NDA. See generally 52 Fed. Reg. 19,476 (1987).
58. Essay, supra note I, at 431.
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pating in double-blind placebo-controlled studies because they may be
randomly selected to receive not the test drug, but a placebo. Prior to
the approval of AZT, the use of placebo-controlled studies was justified
because there was no available therapy with any proven effectiveness to
treat AIDS; volunteers who received a placebo were not foregoing the
opportunity to receive effective treatment. Now that AZT is available, it
would be unethical to design a drug study including patients for whom
AZT is an appropriate therapy, yet withhold that proven drug and 59offer
only a placebo to one group, thus risking their lives unnecessarily.
Lansdale and others have urged that researchers use methods to test
AIDS therapies that do not require an untreated ("placebo") control
group. There has been increased flexibility in study design in recent
years, presumably because of the requirements of medical ethics as applied to individual test subjects and because the research community realizes the plight of PWA.6 0 On the other hand, it is still necessary to
design studies that will efficiently yield adequate evidence of effectiveness.
Thus, in at least some drug tests, researchers must include appropriate
control groups and apply demographic and health-status criteria to the
selection of volunteers.6 1
The speed of drug approval has also accelerated, largely in response
to the AIDS crisis.62 Although the FDA has long classified experimental
drugs by their potential therapeutic importance 63 and directed its attention disproportionately to the more important applications, it has now
adopted specific regulations on the expedited development, evaluation,
and approval of drugs intended to treat life threatening and severely
debilitating illnesses." One important feature of the regulations, recom59. FDA officials indicate that it would be virtually impossible at this time to design a
placebo-controlled AIDS drug study in which the volunteers were not allowed to take AZT.
Studies of the drug dideozyinosine (ddI) have proceeded without a placebo control group.
Alternative methodologies (such as using a "run-in" phase in which one group begins drug use
before the others) have been created to substitute for placebo-controlled studies because of the
ethical considerations. Interview with Dr. Roger Williams, supra note 11. See Essay, supra

note 1, at 422-35.
If the study drug would be toxic when taken with AZT, the only available alternative
treatment, a study design which is both ethical and scientifically appropriate could be elusive.
If volunteers are sought who can no longer tolerate AZT, the testing might all be done in a
patient group whose disease has progressed too far for a fair evaluation of the investigational
drug.
60. Interview with Dr. Roger Williams, supra note 11.
61. Flieger, supra note 4, at 12.
62. The crisis-response nature of the changes in FDA procedures is not surprising given
the past history of drug regulation in this country. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying
text.
63. Schwinghammer, FDA's Rating System for New Drugs, Pharmacy Update, Jan. 14,

1991, at 8.
64. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.80-312.88 (1990) (Drugs Intended to Treat Life Threatening and
Severely-debilitating Illnesses).
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mended by blue-ribbon commissions and previously implemented informally, is early consultation between the drug sponsor and FDA officials
concerning study design.6" Consultative meetings serve to prevent the
delays that occur when FDA reviewers discover after the fact that completed studies have not yielded information needed for approval.6 6 The
most dramatic change under these regulations, though, is that the FDA
would approve drugs for marketing after phase II in return for the sponsor's agreement to conduct so-called phase IV studies, postmarketing
studies to obtain additional information which could not be discovered
during phases I or I.67 AZT was reviewed under expedited approval
procedures, and was available on the market in only two years, after
phase 11.68
In 1987 the FDA adopted regulations regarding treatment use of
investigational drugs (the "Treatment IND").69 These regulations essentially institutionalize and streamline the "compassionate IND" process
to meet the needs of PWA as well as others. Drugs with the potential to
treat serious or immediately life threatening diseases in patients with no
comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy may now be made available for treatment, as contrasted with experimental use during phase III
studies and, in appropriate circumstances, during phase II studies. A
"Treatment IND" will be approved if there is evidence that the drug may
be effective or that it will not expose patients to unreasonable and significant additional risk of illness or injury. Drug companies may charge for,
but may not profit from, Treatment IND distribution. This innovation
makes drugs available to patients who are not eligible for experimental
protocols, which is a significant concern of the AIDS community. From
1987 to 1990, nineteen drugs were made available under the Treatment
70
IND regulations, of which six were for AIDS-related conditions.
While generally applauded, the Treatment IND procedures have
been criticized as not allowing early enough distribution of potentially
useful drugs for AIDS therapy. In 1990 the FDA responded with a policy statement setting up what it calls "parallel track" procedures for drug
65. Such consultation can take the form of oral and written communications as well as
FINAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 39-44, 66-71.
66. Farley, Benefit vs. Risk How FDA Approves New Drugs, FROM TEST TUBE TO CONSUMER: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (An FDA CONSUMER Special
Report), Jan. 1988, at 29.
67. 21 C.F.R. § 312.82(b) (1990); Young, The Reality Behind the Headlines, in FROM
TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (An FDA

agency guidelines.

CONSUMER Special Report), Jan. 1988, at 5.

68. Young, supra note 67, at 5.
69. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34-312.38 (1990).
70. Telephone interview with Winnie Piper, FDA AIDS Coordination Staff (March 25,
1991). Controversy has recently erupted over paperwork requirements for receiving access to
two experimental drugs, DDC and clarithromycin. Chase, supra note 54.
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testing.7 1 Under this mechanism, created only for AIDS and HIV-related diseases, drugs would be made available for treatment purposes
when the evidence for effectiveness is even less than that required for a
Treatment IND. The criteria would include promising evidence of efficacy, evidence that the drug is reasonably safe, sufficient data to recommend an appropriate dose, evidence of a lack of alternative therapy, and
assurance that the treatment availability would not interfere with the recruitment and retention of patients for controlled clinical trials. By
choosing to structure this proposal solely for the AIDS crisis, the FDA is
demonstrating its recognition that regulatory mechanisms can and
should be flexibly tailored to the public's need.7 2
Although these structural changes in the drug approval system appear responsive to appropriate concerns raised by Lansdale and others,
their implementation nevertheless raises significant questions, particularly in regard to informed consent. One major impetus for a patient to
enroll in a drug study is the possibility of obtaining helpful therapy
before it is otherwise available. If, under parallel track or Treatment
IND procedures, one can obtain an investigational drug without having
to risk being placed in a non-treatment or alternative drug control group,
why enroll in a study? To obtain the informed consent of study volunteers, it seems proper to inform them that they may be able to get the
experimental drug without being in the study. This is somewhat of a
circle, however, because drugs cannot be made available under the Treatment IND or parallel track rules unless the necessary clinical studies are
successfully recruiting study volunteers.7 3 Ethicists will need to face the
conundrum that adequately informing potential volunteers of alternative
distribution possibilities may risk their willingness to be in studies-and
simultaneously risk the availability of the alternative distribution.
Researchers have also expressed concerns about these early release
programs. They fear that enrollment in studies might be adversely af71. 55 Fed. Reg. 20,856 (1990).
72. Young, supra note 67, at 5. Cynics would add that FDA appears to be demonstrating
its recognition that street demonstrations, see supra note 32, would not end until it took such
action. The FDA actions are in line with Professor Tribe's suggestion that "relief against
unjust indifference... may require only that the government relax its otherwise reasonable
regulations to accommodate acute instances of need." Tribe, supra note 25, at 1335 n.39. And
they demonstrate the accuracy of Tribe's assertion that some governmental duties are enforceable "in the streets." Id. at 1337. The success of political action by the AIDS community has
spawned attempts to organize similar action among other patient groups. See Beck, The Politics of Breast Cancer, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1990, at 62.
73. 55 Fed. Reg. 20,858 (1990) (assessment criteria for parallel track approval include
"the impact that the parallel track study may have on patient enrollment for the controlled
clinical trials and a proposed plan for monitoring progress of the controlled trials"); 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.34(b)(iii) (1990) (one criterion for treatment IND approval is that the "drug is under
investigation in a controlled clinical trial under an IND in effect for the trial, or all clinical
trials have been completed").
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fected, and completion of controlled clinical trials threatened (as by
dropout of patients who prefer to obtain the test drug in the parallel
track).7 4 In addition, some are concerned about the increased risk of
harm from drugs released earlier in the development process.7
These new mechanisms created by the FDA, especially the parallel
track, address Lansdale's compelling argument that government response to a deadly epidemic disease of unprecedented proportions cannot
proceed in a vacuum. Generally speaking, the American system of drug
approval has protected American consumers very well. For those to
whom an experimental drug on the horizon is the only ray of hope in a
desperate struggle for life, requirements of science and of bureaucracy, of
caution and of regulation, seem at best illogical and at worst cruel. Nevertheless, sound public policy supports both the FDA's initiatives making possible earlier distribution of experimental drugs and the
continuation of a scientifically sound, drug approval system that protects
the patient.
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